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  The post-Keynesian tradition contains two different models of long-run growth in open 
economies: the model of export-led cumulative causation (ELCC) originally conceived by 
Nicholas Kaldor and the model of balance-of-payments-constrained growth (BPCG) developed 
by A.P. Thirlwall. These models diverge significantly in their core underlying assumptions. For 
example, they disagree about whether long-term gains in relative price competitiveness are pos-
sible and whether import demand constrains long-run growth. The two modeling approaches also 
yield conflicting policy implications. For example, some ELCC models imply that a domestic 
demand stimulus can boost long-run growth by sparking a virtuous circle of cumulative causa-
tion (including an endogenous increase in productivity growth), while most BPCG models imply 
that only policies that raise the income elasticity of export demand or lower the income elasticity 
of import demand can permit faster growth in the long run.  The fact that both models have 
found econometric support suggests that each contains empirically supported elements, but the 
tests that have been conducted to date have not had sufficient power to distinguish between them.  
This paper will present both models in a common analytical framework to compare their theoret-
ical differences and policy implications.  The paper will argue that a generalized BPCG model 
that allows for financial flows and relative price effects can incorporate the cumulative causation 
feedbacks from the ELCC approach while also imposing the balance of payments equilibrium 
condition that is missing from the latter. The paper will also explore under what conditions 
different versions of the models apply.1. Introduction 
 
Post-Keynesian economists concerned with long-run growth in open economies have developed 
two related but fundamentally different theoretical approaches. On the one hand, models of 
export-led cumulative causation (ELCC) stress the possibility that some countries can achieve 
ever-widening “virtuous circles” of faster technological progress, improving competitiveness, 
rising exports, and rapid output growth (although, in this view, other countries may be doomed to 
suffer “vicious circles” of slower technological progress, worsening competitiveness, stagnant 
exports, and sluggish output growth). Providing that labor supply constraints can be overcome, 
only the growth of export markets limits long-run growth as exports are seen as the key limiting 
constraint on demand (Cornwall, 1977, p. 163). On the other hand, models of balance-of-
payments-constrained growth (BPCG) emphasize the limitations placed upon a nation’s growth 
by the need to finance necessary imports either through export growth or net financial (“capital”) 
inflows.
1 In this latter view, virtuous circles may be impossible to realize because rapid output 
growth is likely to make imports rise too fast to be compatible with equilibrium in the balance of 
payments (Thirlwall and Dixon, 1979). 
  These two views do coincide in certain respects. Both maintain the Keynesian belief that 
aggregate demand constraints are paramount in determining a nation’s output, even in the long 
run, and see those constraints as lying primarily in the international domain rather than the 
domestic economy.
2 Both theories agree that increasing the growth rate of exports is key to 
                                                 
1 The BPCG literature is now quite voluminous and includes numerous theoretical extensions and empirical tests.  
See McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) for a survey of the early literature and McCombie and Thirlwall (2004) for a 
collection of most of the main contributions up to that point. 
2 In this respect, both views are at odds with other post-Keynesian perspectives that put more emphasis on domestic 
investment demand as constraining profits and growth.  See Robinson (1962) and later expositions by Marglin 
(1984) and Foley and Michl (1999).   2 
 
raising a country’s long-run growth rate of output. Beyond that, however, the two views disagree 
strongly on core theoretical assumptions and policy implications. In theory, the BPCG model 
puts primary emphasis on import demand and the balance of payments, while the ELCC model 
assumes that these are not limiting factors in the growth process. The ELCC model focuses on 
changes in relative cost competitiveness driven by endogenous technological progress as driving 
export success (or failure), while the BPCG model assumes that such changes either dissipate in 
the long run (due to relative purchasing power parity holding) or else have small effects on trade 
flows (so-called “elasticity pessimism”).  
  In terms of policy, perhaps the most radical implication of the ELCC model is that a stim-
ulus to domestic demand can spark a virtuous circle of export-led growth, because of the positive 
response of technology and productivity to faster domestic expansion. In contrast, the BPCG 
model implies that a stimulus to domestic demand is unlikely to bring sustained long-run benefits 
in an open economy because it is likely to raise import demand without boosting exports. The 
two models also have different implications for what kinds of policies can be effective for 
promoting exports in the long run. The ELCC view implies that cost reductions or currency 
depreciations could provoke self-sustaining increases in both exports and output, while the 
BPCG view implies that such policies are likely to be ineffective in the long run and that nothing 
can raise export growth except either faster growth of foreign economies or an increase in the 
income elasticity of export demand. Thus, qualitative competitiveness matters in both theoretical 
approaches, but cost competitiveness and real exchange rates matter only in the ELCC version.
3 
  Strikingly, both of these apparently incompatible theoretical models can claim econo-
metric support. For example, León-Ledesma (2002) estimates an international panel data model 
                                                 
3 Some extensions of the BPCG approach allow for relative price or real exchange rate effects (e.g., Perraton, 2003; 
Blecker, 2002; Dutt, 2002), but I am referring here to the original version of Thirlwall (1979). 3 
 
that supports most ELCC hypotheses, while Alonso and Garcimartín (1998-99) find econometric 
evidence consistent with key components of the BPCG framework. Although these and other 
studies suggest the usefulness of further research in these theoretical frameworks, the existing 
empirical tests have not been powerful enough to enable rejection of one of these two competing 
theoretical approaches or to identify the conditions under which each one applies. 
  This paper seeks first to identify the key theoretical differences between the ELCC and 
BPCG approaches to long-run growth in open economies. Canonical versions of each model will 
be presented and compared, and critiques and counter-critiques of each will be considered. In the 
end, it will be argued that the ELCC growth equilibrium as traditionally modeled is not, in fact, a 
sustainable long-run equilibrium in a well-specified model that incorporates a balance of pay-
ments constraint.  However, we will also show that reaching this conclusion does not require all 
the strong assumptions typically made in the simplest versions of the BPCG approach, particular-
ly the assumptions that rule out relative price (real exchange rate) effects in the long run.  Using 
an extended BPCG model incorporating financial (capital) flows and assuming (following 
Moreno-Brid, 1998) that these must be a constant share of gross domestic product in the long 
run, and also allowing for the relative price effects that are assumed away in Thirlwall’s (1979) 
original approach, we find that a broader solution of the BPCG model—one that allows for 
cumulative causation to have some impact on long-run growth—reconciles the core 
contributions of both approaches. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
 
The ELCC concept harks all the way back to Adam Smith’s (1776, p. 27) famous dictum that 4 
 
“the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market.” Smith envisaged a process of 
dynamic increasing returns in which a larger market for a nation’s output would lead to greater 
specialization, improved technology, and higher productivity. Smith fashioned this principle into 
the foundation for what he called one of “the two distinct benefits” of international trade:
4 
By means of [foreign trade], the narrowness of the home market does not hinder 
the division of labour in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being 
carried to the highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for 
whatever part of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it 
encourages them to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual 
produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real wealth and revenue of the 
society. (Smith, 1776, pp. 561-62) 
  Smith’s emphasis on dynamic feedbacks from exports to productivity growth was largely 
forgotten after Ricardo (1821) shifted the focus of international trade theory to static efficiency 
gains based on comparative advantage.
5 However, the idea of dynamic feedbacks was revived by 
some of the early post-World War II development economists, especially Myrdal (1957) in his 
“principle of circular and cumulative causation.” Later, Kaldor borrowed this concept in his 
work on explaining differences in growth rates among the industrialized nations (Kaldor, 1966, 
1970) and in arguing that the pervasiveness of increasing returns invalidates the general equilib-
rium approach to economics (Kaldor, 1972). More specifically, Kaldor came to believe that the 
analysis of economic growth should be founded on a series of empirical generalizations or “styl-
ized facts,” which have come to be known as “Kaldor’s Growth Laws.” Four of these laws, as 
summarized by Thirlwall (1983, pp. 345-47, italics in original) are most relevant to the present 
analysis: 
i) The faster the rate of growth of the manufacturing sector, the faster will be the 
                                                 
4 The other “distinct benefit,” the so-called “vent-for-surplus,” has proven more controversial.  For an interpretation 
that reconciles the two benefits along with citations to previous interpretations, see Blecker (1997). 
5 Mainstream trade theorists did not return to Smithian concepts of static and dynamic increasing returns until the 
work of Krugman (1990, 1991) and other “new” trade theorists in the late 20
th century. 5 
 
rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).... 
ii) The faster the rate of growth of manufacturing output, the faster will be the rate 
of growth of labor productivity in manufacturing owing to static and dynamic 
economies of scale, or increasing returns in the widest sense.... 
vi) The growth of manufacturing output is not constrained by labor supply but is 
fundamentally determined by demand from agriculture in the early stage of devel-
opment and exports in the later stages....  
vii) A fast rate of growth of exports and output will tend to set up a cumulative 
process, or virtuous circle of growth, though the link between output growth and 
productivity growth. 
Of these propositions, number ii) is based on Verdoorn’s (1949) empirical finding of a positive 
correlation between the growth rates of labor productivity and output in manufacturing across 
countries, and thus is often referred to as “Verdoorn’s Law.” 
  Several economists developed explicit models of export-led growth that sought to incor-
porate these ideas of cumulative causation. Early contributions included Beckerman (1962) and 
Lamfalussy (1963), but the most widely known and accepted version is due to Dixon and Thirl-
wall (1975) and was further developed by Cornwall (1977), Setterfield and Cornwall (2002), and 
Setterfield (2002), among many others.
6  A canonical version of the export-led growth model 
with cumulative causation is presented in the next section, so we will not discuss the mathemati-
cal details here. However, Figure 1 shows the basic logic of a simplified version of the ELCC 
model, showing the “circular and cumulative causation” between export growth, output growth, 
productivity growth, and international competitiveness (measured by the rate of increase in the 
real exchange rate or relative price of foreign goods). The diagram is drawn to represent a 
“virtuous circle” of increases in all these factors; a “vicious circle” of decreases in all these 
factors could be represented simply by reversing the upward direction of the arrows shown next 
                                                 
6 A similar model is used by Roberts (2007) to demonstrate that the ELCC model implicitly contains “conditional 
convergence” properties similar to those found in the Solow (1956) neoclassical growth model. 6 
 
to the variables. Unlike many of the earlier models in the literature (but more similar to 
Setterfield and Cornwall, 2002), the graphical representation in Figure 1 ignores the special role 
























  In terms of empirical support, it is worth remembering that the ELCC model was devel-
oped as a generalization of empirical regularities found in early cross-country regression analy-
sis, including Kaldor (1966) and other studies around that time.  Each of the linkages shown in 
Figure 1 is equivalent to a structural equation of an ELCC model, and each one claims empirical 
support in some of those studies.  More recently, León-Ledesma (2002) has estimated an 
extended version of an ELCC model for 17 countries over four time periods between 1965 and 
1994, in which a fifth endogenous variable (a measure of R&D expenditures) is added, and a 
number of exogenous variables are included to help identify the structural equations in a simul-7 
 
taneous equations framework.  León-Ledesma finds that the coefficients representing the key 
causal relationships in his extended ELCC model have the theoretically expected signs and are 
statistically significant, using two- and three-stage least squares to solve the identification prob-
lem.  These estimates confirm that the structural relationships assumed in the ELCC framework 
continue to have empirical support using more recent data and econometric methods.  However, 
León-Ledesma does not test for whether the long-run average growth rates of the countries are 
the ones that would be predicted by his ELCC model, as opposed to any other particular model 
(such as Solow, BPCG, etc.).
7   
  Almost as soon as it was developed, the ELCC growth model received an important chal-
lenge from Thirlwall (1979) and others who, although sympathetic to the Kaldorian approach, 
believed that the ELCC models erred in ignoring the role of import demand and neglecting to 
incorporate a balance of payments equilibrium condition. Thirlwall and Dixon (1979, p. 173) 
criticized these models (including their own earlier version) because “No consideration is given 
to the possibility that the rate of growth of income determined by the model may generate a rate 
of growth of imports in excess of the rate of growth of exports, thereby imposing a constraint on 
the export-led growth rate if balance of payments equilibrium must be preserved.” If import 
demand is incorporated into the model and a balance of payments constraint is imposed, exports 
continue to play a key role in determining long-run growth because faster growth of exports 
allows faster growth of imports without risking a chronic balance of payments (current account) 
deficit.
8 Nevertheless, Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) showed that, under certain assumptions, the 
                                                 
7 It is interesting to note also that, given his specification of time periods (dividing the 1965-94 period into four sub-
periods for which data are averaged), León-Ledesma’s results can be considered more medium-run than long-run 
(the significance of this distinction will become clear below). 
8 Although this literature generally refers to “balance of payments” equilibrium, it is clear from the context that what 
is meant is really balance in the current account. 8 
 
cumulative causation mechanism is thwarted and the growth rate consistent with equilibrium in 
the balance of payments—the balance-of-payments-constrained (BPC) growth rate—is deter-
mined solely by the ratio of the growth rate of exports to the income elasticity of import demand 
—irrespective of whether Verdoorn’s Law (Kaldor’s second law, which incorporates dynamic 
increasing returns) holds.  
  This solution for the BPC growth rate, which is also found in Thirlwall (1979), is some-
times referred to (following Davidson, 1990-91) as “Thirlwall’s Law.”  This simple version of 
the “Law” depends on certain strong assumptions, however.  One of these assumptions is that the 
current account must be balanced in the long run. The BPCG model can easily be modified to 
allow for a long-run current account imbalance matched by a sustainable level of “capital” (net 
financial) inflows or outflows.
9 One way of incorporating financial flows was introduced by 
Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), who focused on the growth rate of net financial inflows compared 
with the growth rate of the value of exports (i.e., the sum of the growth rates of export prices and 
export volumes). An alternative method was developed by Moreno-Brid (1998), who assumed 
that the current account balance (which must be equal to net financial inflows) must be a con-
stant share of GDP in the long run.  Although either way of modeling financial flows is easily 
accommodated in the BPCG model from a mathematical viewpoint, Thirlwall and Hussain’s 
approach potentially allows for a perpetually rising ratio of financial inflows (net borrowing) to 
GDP, which cannot be sustainable, and therefore Moreno-Brid’s approach is superior from the 
vantage point of modeling a long-run balance of payments constraint incorporating sustainable 
financial inflows.  Therefore, we will focus mainly on Moreno-Brid’s approach to financial 
flows in our analysis, but we will also briefly consider the implications of adopting the Thirlwall 
                                                 
9 In this paper, I will adopt the terminology of modern balance-of-payments accounting (e.g., in the IMF and US 
government presentations)  in referring to “financial flows” and the “financial account,” rather than “capital flows” 
and the “capital account,” regardless of the terminology used in earlier studies. 9 
 
and Hussain framework. 
  A second key assumption in Thirlwall’s Law is that there are no relative price effects in 
the long run. This assumption is crucial for ruling out cumulative causation as long as the latter is 
modeled as lowering the relative price of a country’s exports by raising its productivity growth 
rate. Thirlwall (1979) argued that it is realistic to assume that relative purchasing power (PPP) 
holds in the long run, so that relative prices of home and foreign goods (measured in a common 
currency) do not change. In this case, any competitive gains from more rapid productivity growth 
must be offset either by exchange rate appreciation or a rise in domestic prices (perhaps, 
although Thirlwall did not say so, because of increasing nominal wages or raw materials costs; 
he simply cited the famous “law of one price”).
10 Alternatively, Thirlwall and Dixon (1979) 
point out that the same result is achieved if the price elasticities of export and import demand (in 
absolute value) sum to approximately unity, so that the Marshall-Lerner condition
11 is not 
satisfied and changes in relative international prices have no effect on the trade balance (this 
assumption can be referred to as “elasticity pessimism”).
12 Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) accept 
that changes in export prices (which, in their model, are the same as domestic prices) may be 
significant for developing countries, but only insofar as they affect the real value of net financial 
inflows measured in home currency—not for cumulative causation reasons (which are implicitly 
ruled out by the assumption of PPP, and perhaps were considered less important for developing 
                                                 
10 For an analysis of the stability of the equilibrium in a Thirlwall-type BPCG model focusing mainly on labor 
markets and wage dynamics, see Pugno (1998). 
11 The Marshall-Lerner condition states that a real devaluation of a country’s currency will improve its balance of 
trade if the absolute value of the sum of the price elasticities of export and import demand exceeds unity, under 
certain assumptions including initially balanced trade. The extended Marshall-Lerner condition with nonzero net 
financial flows and imbalanced trade is stated below. 
12 There is a slight difference in the Thirlwall’s Law solutions under these two assumptions, i.e., PPP and elasticity 
pessimism, as discussed below.  10 
 
countries that historically were largely specialized in primary products).
13 
  It is not so clear, however, that relative price or real exchange rate effects can be com-
pletely neglected on either of these grounds. Alonso and Garcimartín (1998) find econometric 
evidence for the “elasticity pessimism” view in most of the industrialized countries covered in 
their study (Canada and Japan are two notable exceptions, where they find that Marshall-Lerner 
holds), but other empirical studies have found price elasticities of exports and imports that sum 
to more than unity for most countries (e.g., Cline, 1989).
14  In studies of various individual 
countries, ranging from the US to Japan to India, Marshall-Lerner is usually found to hold (e.g., 
Lawrence, 1990; Blecker, 1992; Razmi, 2005).  At best, the evidence on elasticity pessimism is 
mixed, and elasticity estimates vary widely across different countries, time periods, and econo-
metric methodologies. Moreover, according to standard J-curve logic, we would expect price 
elasticities to be relatively low and Marshall-Lerner to be violated in the short run (i.e., up to a 
year or two following a devaluation), but elasticities to increase (in absolute value) and satisfy 
Marshall-Lerner over longer time periods when trade flows are (for well-known reasons) easier 
to adjust. 
  The empirical evidence on long-run, relative PPP is also mixed, and highly sensitive to 
the currencies, price indexes, time periods, and econometric methods used (Rogoff, 1996).
15 One 
                                                 
13 Perraton (2003) finds that including terms of trade (relative price) effects, i.e., not assuming PPP, improves the fit 
of BPCG models applied to data for developing countries. 
14 Alonso and Garcimartín (1998) also find evidence for the BPCG view that output growth rates, rather than inter-
national relative prices (real exchange rates), are the variable that adjusts to restore balance of payments equilibrium 
when countries are tending to run surpluses or deficits on current account.  While I am not aware of any studies that 
contradict this finding, it does not necessarily imply either that relative prices don’t change in the long run or that 
changes in relative prices have no effects when they do occur. Furthermore,  the estimates of León-Ledesma (2002) 
suggest that relative prices do change as predicted in the ELCC model, i.e., in response to productivity growth 
differentials, and do impact on export growth. 
15 In fairness to Thirlwall (1979), the evidence for PPP was stronger at the time he conceived the BPCG model, 
based mainly on data from the Bretton Woods period of adjustable pegs for exchange rates.  The behavior of real 
exchange rates since the collapse of Bretton Woods and the advent of flexible rates has been less kind to the PPP 
hypothesis. 11 
 
recent survey summarizes the descriptive evidence from US-UK exchange rates as follows: 
Neither absolute nor relative PPP appear to hold closely in the short run, although 
both appear to hold reasonably well as a long-run average and when there are 
large movements in relative prices, and both appear to hold better between 
producer price indices than between consumer price indices. (Taylor and Taylor, 
2004, p. 139).  
An empirical literature from the 1990s that found that real exchange rates were not mean-
reverting even in the long run has now been overturned by more powerful econometric methods, 
but more recent studies find that the speed of adjustment to PPP can sometimes be slow and 
mean-reversion may be non-linear (i.e., faster for larger deviations from PPP) (Taylor and 
Taylor, 2004).  It is clear that relative PPP does hold over long periods of time such as a half 
century or longer for certain major currencies, but it is far from clear that it holds for shorter time 
periods (e.g., decades) or all currencies.
16 
  Furthermore, there is no consensus that the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate 
should be constant over time (and some of the newer studies finding faster rates of adjustment 
also allow for varying equilibrium rates). Many economists have argued that real exchange rates 
need to change in the long run in response to factors such as international differences in income 
elasticities of export and import demand and income growth rates (Houthakker and Magee, 
1969), international differences in relative rates of productivity growth between tradable and 
nontradable goods (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964; Chinn, 2000), and changes in international 
asset or debt positions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002).
17   
  Although it is difficult to summarize the subtle and ever-changing literature on PPP, it 
does seem safe (at present!) to conclude that the longer the time period one considers, the more 
                                                 
16 For example, Bahmani-Oskoee (1995) found that PPP held for only 8 out of 22 developing countries studied. 
17 Williamson (1994) and Cline and Williamson (2009) have calculated what they call “fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rates” (FEERs) that are derived from a model of the exchange rates that would be required to maintain a 
sustainable current account surplus or deficit for each country, given the relevant parameters in the export and 
import demand functions and trend growth rates. These FEERs are not constant in the long run. 12 
 
likely it is that relative PPP will hold. Moreover, it also seems that PPP is more likely to hold 
between countries that are more structurally similar and hence do not have reasons for their 
equilibrium real exchange rates to change over long periods of time.  In fact, recent empirical 
studies in the BPCG framework using modern time-series methods have found that the model 
without relative price effects applies better over very long time periods than over medium-run 
periods.  For example, Razmi (2005) finds that the BPCG model explains Indian growth well 
over very long time periods (his data are for 1950-99, and the model predicts actual growth well 
for the full sample and periods up to about 30 years).  Razmi (2005) reports that “income was by 
far the dominant influence in determining the balance of payments constraint in the long run,” 
but in shorter periods (such as decades), there are substantial variations of actual growth from 
BPCG predictions and relative price effects cannot be neglected.  This conclusion, supported by 
the results of León-Ledesma (2002) discussed earlier, opens the door to incorporating cumulative 
causation and relative price effects in BPCG models applied to medium-run time periods, even if 
those effects are not plausible over very long-run periods. 
 
3. The Canonical Export-Led Growth Model 
 
  The following model, which is adapted with some modifications from Setterfield and 
Cornwall (2002), represents the core ideas of the ELCC approach.
18 Essentially, this model 
provides the math that expresses the cumulative causation process shown in Figure 1.  Although 
the model is simplified in certain respects compared to earlier ELCC models discussed in the 
previous section (especially in not treating manufacturing and other sectors separately), the 
                                                 
18 The first three equations of the model correspond closely to the earlier model of Dixon and Thirlwall (1975); the 
fourth equation is Setterfield and Cornwall’s innovation.  See also note 21 below. 13 
 
model has been specified in aggregate terms to facilitate comparisons with the BPCG model in 
later sections.  This aggregative approach can also be justified by appeal to Kaldor’s first law, 
which, as stated above, says that faster growth of manufacturing output results in faster growth 
of aggregate output (i.e., the manufacturing sector is the “engine of growth” for the whole 
economy). 
  Starting on the export side, export demand is specified as a conventional, constant-
elasticity function of the real exchange rate and foreign income. With all variables measured in 
instantaneous rate-of-change form (differences in natural logarithms) for convenience, the export 
function is: 
( 1 )       x = εx(e + p* − p) + ηxy* , 
where x is export growth, e is the rate of nominal currency depreciation (log difference of the 
nominal exchange rate, measured in home currency per unit of foreign currency), p and p* are 
the rates of change in the home and foreign price indexes, respectively, y* is foreign (rest-of-
world) income growth, and εx and ηx are the price and income elasticities of export demand, 
respectively (defined so that εx, ηx > 0). Note that (e + p* − p) represents the rate of real 
depreciation of the home currency, or rate of increase in the relative price of foreign goods. 
  Foreign price inflation p* is taken as exogenously given on the small country assumption, 
but domestic price inflation p is determined by changes in unit labor costs and the gross profit 
markup: 
( 2 )        p = τ + w – q , 
where (again with all variables in growth rate form) τ is the rate of change in (one plus) the 
markup over unit labor cost, w is the rate of wage inflation, and q is the rate of labor productivity 
growth. Although markups can change due to changes in non-labor costs or competitive condi-14 
 
tions in markets,
19 we abstract from changes in markups here for simplicity and assume τ = 0. 
Productivity growth is assumed to be endogenous according to a simplified, aggregative version 
of Verdoorn’s Law:
20 
( 3 )        q = q0 + αy , 
where q0 is a shift factor representing autonomous technological dynamism (including catch-up 
possibilities) and technology policies (e.g., R&D subsidies, intellectual property rights, etc.), α 
represents the Verdoorn effect (dynamic increasing returns or positive feedbacks), and q0, α > 0. 
  Finally, aggregate demand (national income) increases at a rate determined by the 
weighted average of the growth rates of export demand and domestic expenditures multiplied by 
the Keynesian multiplier λ:
21 
( 4 )       y = λ(ωaa + ωxx) , 
where a is the growth rate of domestic expenditures
22 and ωa and ωx are the shares of domestic 
expenditures and exports (respectively) in total demand. Equations (1), (2), and (4) can then be 
combined (assuming τ = 0) to yield what Setterfield and Cornwall (2002) call the “demand 
regime” (DR) equation,
23 
                                                 
19 See Blecker (1998) for a BPCG model that incorporates flexible markups with partial pass-through of exchange 
rate changes. 
20 The simplification here is that aggregate productivity growth is assumed to depend on aggregate demand for all 
goods and services, rather than this relationship being confined to the manufacturing sector as in the original 
Verdoorn-Kaldor specification discussed earlier. 
21 See Setterfield and Cornwall (2002, pp. 81-82, Appendix 5.A) for derivation.  Most earlier ELCC models simply 
assume that y is an increasing function of x, but do not explicitly include a. 
22 Domestic expenditures, often referred to as “absorption,” are equal to the sum of consumption, investment, and 
government purchases. 
23 This solution differs in some respects from Setterfield and Cornwall’s DR relation. They ignore exchange rates 
and wages, effectively assuming that e = w = 0. They also assume that p* is determined by foreign equations for 
markup pricing and Verdoorn’s Law parallel to equations (2) and (3) here; in our notation, (2′) p* = τ* + w* – q* 
and (3′) q* = q0* + α*y*, where the *’s indicate foreign variables or parameters (the authors omit the * on q0*, but I 
presume this was a typographical error).  Since Setterfield and Cornwall also assume w* = τ* = 0, p* ultimately 
depends only on y*, which is taken as exogenously given. Thus, in their model (but in our notation, and after 15 
 
( 5 )        q y x xε λω + Ω =  
where  ( ) [ ]
* * ) ( y w p e a x x x a η ε ω ω λ + − + + = Ω  and the variables a, e, p*, w, and y* are all treated 
as exogenously given constants.
24 
  Then, defining the Verdoorn equation (3) as the “productivity regime” (PR), Setterfield 
and Cornwall note that (3) and (5) together constitute a system of two linear equations in two 
endogenous variables (output growth y and productivity growth q), taking all other variables as 
exogenously given. Provided that there is not too much cumulative causation, this system then 
solves for a unique and stable equilibrium. Graphically (see Figure 2), this requires that the PR 
line be steeper than the DR line in q×y space, which is equivalent to the slope condition 1/α > 
λωxεx  or αλωxεx < 1. Contrary to what Kaldor suggested, the mere existence of cumulative 
causation is not sufficient to create a disequilibrium situation in the long run; only if the forces of 
cumulative causation are very strong (i.e.,  1 > x xε αλω , or PR is flatter than DR as drawn in 
Figure 2) would an equilibrium not exist.
25 Assuming that the equilibrium exists, the equilibrium 
ELCC growth rate yE is determined by the simultaneous solution of equations (3) and (5): 















     
                                                                                                                                                             
correcting the typographical error in their published solution), the constant term in their DR relation is 
[ ]
* * *
0 ) ( y q a x x x x x a ε α η ω ε ω ω λ − + − = Ω . We prefer to treat p* as exogenously given and to allow explicitly for e 
and w to assume nonzero values, since this is not only more general but also facilitates comparisons with the BPCG 
model below. 
24 This means that domestic demand, the nominal exchange rate, foreign prices, domestic wages, and foreign income 
are all assumed to grow at constant rates. While treating foreign variables as exogenously given can be justified on 
the “small country” assumption, assuming that the other variables are fixed independently of home country output 
and productivity growth is more dubious, and the implications of this assumption will be discussed below.  
25 Although it may seem contrary to the spirit of Kaldor (1972) to represent his model in a way that has an equilib-
rium solution, it should be noted that this demand-determined growth equilibrium is quite different from a conven-
tional model of a long-run growth path determined by increases in factor supplies and exogenous technological pro-
gress.  Disequilibrium in the ELCC model presented here would imply ever-rising or ever-falling growth rates, 
which do not seem plausible in the long run (China may have grown at a rapid 10% clip in recent years, but this rate 
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  Not surprisingly, any shock that would exogenously stimulate productivity growth (for 
example, an R&D subsidy or improved property rights in innovations) would increase q0 and 
shift the PR line down and to the right, thereby having a positive effect on the equilibrium 
growth rate yE. Similarly, any event that would stimulate exports to grow faster (such as a faster 
rate of currency depreciation e, faster foreign income growth y*, or an opening of foreign 
markets that raised the income-elasticity of export demand ηx) would shift the DR line upward, 
also increasing the ELCC growth rate yE. What is most surprising in this model, however, is that 
a stimulus to domestic demand (increase in a) would have the same effect as a stimulus to export 
demand in shifting the DR line up, thereby permanently raising the equilibrium growth rate yE. In 
fact, given the logic of this model, the domestic demand stimulus would actually increase export 
growth by causing productivity to rise faster, thereby making exports more competitive. 
  This may seem like a strong, if not unbelievable, conclusion. Of course, this strong result 
stems in part from the oversimplified, aggregative nature of the present model. In a more com-17 
 
plete ELCC framework, in which the Verdoorn relationship (endogenous productivity growth) 
was limited to the manufacturing sector, only the part of increase domestic demand that went 
toward the purchase of domestically produced manufactures would be able to kick-start the 
process of cumulative causation; demand increases that were spent on services or imports would 
not have the same effect. Still, even if only a portion of the demand stimulus raised spending on 
domestic manufactures of exportable goods, at least some long-term benefit would result. 
  However, even leaving these issues of disaggregation aside, the ELCC model laid out 
above ignores other key economic forces that could limit the cumulative growth gains from any 
type of demand stimulus, especially a domestic one but also an export-led one. Perhaps most 
obviously, the assumption that the nominal rates of currency depreciation e and wage inflation w 
would remain constant irrespective of an increase in domestic growth of output and productivity 
could be called into question. Much theory and intuition suggests that a country experiencing an 
export-led boom might be expected to confront pressures toward currency appreciation (lower e) 
or faster wage increases (higher w). The former can be avoided through maintaining a fixed nom-
inal peg for the exchange rate, or through currency market intervention (as in China in the past 
decade), provided that the central bank can sterilize the resulting reserve accumulation.
26 The 
latter, however, is harder to avoid.  
  Advocates of the ELCC approach (e.g., Cornwall, 1977) emphasize that the labor supply 
is not an inelastic constraint on long-run growth, as it appears in conventional models of the 
Solow (1956) variety. To be sure, labor supplies can vary elastically in the growth process due to 
factors such as international migration (including temporary guest worker programs as well as 
more permanent forms of migration) and changes in social norms regarding age and gender in 
                                                 
26 Another possibility is that the current account surplus could be lent to other nations, resulting in an offsetting 
financial (private capital) account deficit and preventing reserve accumulation.  18 
 
the workplace. In multisectoral models, labor can potentially be drawn out of less-productive 
agricultural or service sectors into manufacturing.  In developing countries with dual economies, 
migration of “surplus labor” from rural or pre-modern areas may augment “modern sector” labor 
supplies. But unless the labor supply is perfectly elastic at the current wage level, it would seem 
that some upward pressure on wages is unavoidable in a rapidly growing economy (and China, 
where wages have increased significantly, is no exception). Thus, some of the optimistic aspects 
of the ELCC model stem from the implicit assumption that improvements in cost competitive-
ness due to faster productivity growth are not counterbalanced by offsetting currency apprecia-
tion or wage increases. While one cannot necessarily assume that these adjustments will fully 
offset all competitive gains in a process of cumulative causation—exchange rates do not always 
behave as predicted, and wage increases may lag behind productivity growth—neither should 
one ignore these types of adjustments altogether. 
 
4. The Balance-of-Payments-Constrained Growth Model 
 
A related but distinct critique of the ELCC approach concerns the fact that the ELCC model 
lacks an import function and a balance-of-payments equilibrium condition, and hence “the 
equilibrium growth rate specified may be inconsistent with the long run requirement of payments 
balance” (Thirlwall and Dixon, 1979, p. 173). This section presents the model of Thirlwall and 
Dixon (1979), who sought to correct this problem, although their model will be modified to 
incorporate net financial flows following the approach of Moreno-Brid (1998). 
  To enhance comparability with the ELCC model in the preceding section, equations (1) 
through (3) are all retained, including the Verdoorn relation to incorporate cumulative causation. 19 
 
The model is then augmented by adding a conventional import demand function with constant 
elasticities 
(7)     m = − εm(e + p* − p) + ηmy  , 
where m is import growth and εm and ηm are the price and income elasticities of import demand, 
respectively (defined so that εm, ηm > 0).  Next, we define balance of payments equilibrium as 
implying that the current account balance (surplus or deficit) must equal a constant, sustainable 
ratio to national income. Following the approach of Moreno-Brid (1998), but converted into our 
notation, a constant ratio of the current account balance to GDP implies that 
(8)     θ(x – y) = e + p* – p + m – y , 
where θ is the ratio of the value of exports to the value of imports, both measured in domestic 
currency.
27 Note that (8) now replaces (4) as the equation that determines the output growth 
rate.
28 
  Now, suppose that an economy in which cumulative causation operates via Verdoorn’s 
Law is subject to the balance of payments constraint specified in (8). If we substitute equations 
(1), (2), (3), and (7) into (8) and solve for y, again assuming τ = 0, we obtain a very general 
expression for the balance of payments constrained growth rate, yB:
29 
(9)    
) 1 ( 1




− + − + −





y q w p e
y
ε θε α θ η
θη ε θε
.  
                                                 
27 See Moreno-Brid (1998) for the derivation. The more traditional assumption of balanced trade (i.e., a current 
account balance equal to zero) in the long run is the special case in which θ = 1 and (8) becomes p + x = e + p* + m. 
28 Since equation (4) still has to hold—it is, after all, nothing more than a dynamic version of the standard Keynesian 
multiplier for national income determination—this means that the domestic expenditure growth rate a in equation 
(4) must now become endogenous in the long run so that national income will tend to grow at the rate implied by 
(8). This point is discussed further below. 
29 This equation combines the solution of Thirlwall and Dixon (1979, p. 183, equation 19) for a BPCG model with 
cumulative causation with the solution of Moreno-Brid (1998, p. 418, equation 8) for a model including financial 
(capital) mobility, both translated into the present notation.  In order for the model to yield intuitively plausible 
results, the denominator of this solution must be assumed to be positive.  See also note 30, below. 20 
 
  It is at this point that the BPCG theorists introduce their strong assumptions to rule out 
relative price effects.  First, suppose that the price elasticities of import and export demand are 
too low to satisfy the extended Marshall-Lerner condition with financial flows; more specific-
ally, suppose θεx + εm ≈ 1.
30 Under this assumption, (9) reduces to
31 












and α (the Verdoorn coefficient representing endogenous feedbacks from income growth to 
productivity growth) has no effect on the BPC equilibrium growth rate. If we further add the 
assumption that trade must be balanced in the long run, so that θ = 1, then (10) becomes: 
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  Second, consider what happens if relative PPP is assumed, so that e + p* − p = 0. To see 
the implications, note that when e + p* − p = 0 is assumed, the relative price change terms drop 
out of both the export and import demand functions (equations 1 and 7) and also from the 
equilibrium condition (8).  Since Verdoorn’s Law (3) and markup pricing (2) enter the model 
only through the relative price effects, these two relationships also disappear from the solution.  
In this case, x = ηxy* by (1) and m = ηmy by (7), and substituting these into the equilibrium 
condition 
(8′)       θ(x – y) = m – y ,   
                                                 
30 From now on, the term “elasticity pessimism” will be used to represent this assumption in models that allow for 
financial flows.  Note that the extended Marshall-Lerner condition θεx + εm > 1 is less likely to hold, and the alterna-
tive that θεx + εm ≈ 1 is more likely to hold, the lower is θ (i.e., the bigger is the country’s trade deficit), for any giv-
en values of εx and εm.  To this extent, elasticity pessimism is more warranted in countries with large initial deficits. 
31 Again, for intuitively sensible results (a positive growth rate), the denominator must be positive.  This is very 
likely in equation (10), since the only way it could be negative would be for a country to have a very low income 
elasticity of import demand ηm and a very large trade deficit (θ << 1), which seems like an unlikely combination.  If 
ηm > 1, as seems to be empirically true in most countries, then ηm – 1 +θ > 0 regardless of the size of θ (since θ > 0). 21 
 
the model again solves for equation (10)—or (11) if we also assume θ = 1.  Furthermore, in this 

















    Now, several important points emerge immediately. First, there are a variety of different 
solutions for the BPC growth rate, depending on what we assume about three factors: price elas-
ticities, real exchange rates, and financial flows.  Equation (11′) states the simplest and perhaps 
best known version of Thirlwall’s Law, but it is a special case that requires both PPP and the 
absence of financial flows.  Second, which of these versions of the BPCG model applies is likely 
to depend on the time frame considered.  As noted earlier, elasticity pessimism is more likely to 
hold in the short run than in the long run, while PPP (i.e., the absence of real exchange rate 
changes) is more likely to hold in the long run than in the short or medium run (and the validity 
of both assumptions can vary across countries).  Third, none of these solutions (i.e., equations 9, 
10, 10′, 11, or 11′) is equivalent to the ELCC growth rate shown in equation (6). Thus, regardless 
of what we assume about these factors, the economy is not likely to grow at the ELCC growth 
rate (6) if the balance of payments constraint is effective, even if cumulative causation effects are 
present, relative price effects are significant, and financial flows are allowed.  Fourth, merely 
assuming that the balance of payments must be in equilibrium (in the sense that the current 
account balance is either zero or a sustainable, constant fraction of GDP) does not necessarily 
rule out any impact of cumulative causation effects on the economy’s long-run growth rate.  As 
long as PPP does not hold and the extended Marshall-Lerner condition does hold, cumulative 
causation can affect the most general BPC growth rate (9) even though this is not the same as the 
                                                 
32 Perraton (2003) refers to equation (11) as the “strong” form of Thirlwall’s BPCG hypothesis and (11′) as the 
“weak” form.   22 
 
ELCC growth rate (6).
33  For the reasons noted earlier, this is more likely to occur in medium-
run time periods (e.g., decades) than over longer ones (e.g., generations or half centuries). 
 
5. Reconciling the Two Growth Rates 
 
  To fix ideas, it is helpful to compare the ELCC and BPCG solutions graphically. Here, 
we use the most general solution for the BPC growth rate, i.e., equation (9), which allows for 
cumulative causation effects and financial flows, does not assume PPP, and does assume that the 
extended Marshall-Lerner condition holds.  To represent this solution on the same type of 
diagram as was used for the ELCC model in Figure 2, it is convenient to substitute equations (1), 
(2), and (7) into (8)—again assuming τ = 0 and taking e and w as exogenously given—and obtain 
the following equation for y as a function of q: 
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This relationship, which is upward sloping as long as the extended Marshall-Lerner condition 
holds and PPP does not hold (and horizontal if either Marshall-Lerner is violated or PPP holds),
34 
may be called the “BP constraint” (for balance of payments). 
  Graphically, the BPCG solution yB is represented by the point where the BP constraint 
(12) intersects the PR relation (3), just as the ELCC solution yE is represented by the point where 
DR (5) intersects PR (3).  In general, the BP relation may lie either above or below the DR  
                                                 
33 Note that, assuming θεx + εm > 1 and e + p* − p ≠ 0, and also assuming that the denominator of (9) is positive as 
discussed above, then ∂yB/∂α > 0 in (9). 
34 Note that, if the extended Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold, (12) becomes (10), and if PPP does hold, then 
(12) becomes (10′).  Either way, the BP relationship then becomes horizontal in Figures 3 and 4, i.e., yB is independ-




























relation, as there is no reason (from inspection of equations 5 and 12) that one is necessarily 
higher than the other.
35  Thus, Figure 3 shows the case where yE > yB and Figure 4 shows the 
                                                 
35 Since this statement applies to the slopes as well as the intercepts in equations (5) and (12), the DR and BP rela-
tions could also intersect, thereby creating additional cases not shown in Figures 3 and 4.  These other cases are not 24 
 
opposite situation.  Let us focus, with no loss of generality, on the case shown in Figure 3, where 
the ELCC growth rate exceeds the BPC growth rate.   
  Now, it might be thought that allowing for financial flows to be somewhat elastic might 
relax the BP constraint, effectively permitting the BP constraint to shift upward until yB would 
coincide with yE.  After all, financial flows do not have to be fixed at a given percentage of GDP; 
some range of current account imbalances can be sustainable as long as the interest rate on the 
foreign debt is not too high relative to the country’s growth rate.  Since the BP equation (12) 
assumes a given ratio of the current account balance to GDP (CA/Y), can’t we just assume that 
this ratio might fall somewhat, thereby enabling the economy to borrow more and thereby to 
reach the ELCC growth rate without risking a payments disequilibrium? 
  The answer, somewhat surprisingly, is no, at least not if we model financial flows follow-
ing the approach of Moreno-Brid (1998) as we have here.  To see this point, recall that the BP 
equilibrium condition (8) is specified in growth rate form, and assumes a constant ratio CA/Y. 
An increase in the level of this ratio does not change the form of the equilibrium condition (8).  
Of course, greater net financial inflows would imply a lower ratio of exports to imports θ, but 
this has ambiguous effects on the height of the BP relation (12) and may very well shift it down 
(away from DR) instead of up (toward DR).
36  Or, to put the point another way, note that at the 
ELCC equilibrium (y = yE) in Figure 3, the economy is not merely experiencing a current 
                                                                                                                                                             
considered for reasons of space, and because the key theoretical points can be illustrated with full generality by 
reference to the simpler cases shown in these two figures. 
36 Consider, for example, the simple case of a horizontal BP constraint given by equation (10), which would apply if 
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which has the same sign as ηm – 1.  If ηm > 1, as is often found empirically, the BP relation would shift down when 
θ falls.  If elasticity pessimism or PPP is violated so that the more general BP equation (12) applies, this derivative 
becomes more complex but does not cease to be ambiguous in sign. 25 
 
account deficit, but rather a current account balance that is continuously falling relative to GDP.  
In other words, it is not possible to grow at the rate yE with any constant ratio CA/Y, and 
therefore yE is simply unsustainable in the long run.  Similarly, in Figure 4, the economy cannot 
grow at yE except if it could have a perpetually rising ratio CA/Y, which is also not sustainable. 
  Note that the impossibility of growing at yE derives simply from the assumptions that 
balance of payments equilibrium must be maintained in the long run and that financial flows 
cannot increase or decrease indefinitely as a percentage of GDP (i.e., as long as the ratio CA/Y 
cannot rise or fall continuously).  The strong assumptions of either PPP or elasticity pessimism 
are not required for this result.  If neither of these assumptions holds, the correctly specified BPC 
growth rate incorporates cumulative causation effects, as in equation (9).  But it is this growth 
rate, and not the ELCC growth rate (6), that should be considered as the long-run equilibrium 
growth rate in a properly specified post-Keynesian open economy model.  Thirlwall and Dixon 
(1979) were correct in saying that either PPP or elasticity pessimism rules out cumulative causa-
tion effects on the BPC growth rate, but they were incorrect in implying that these assumptions 
are necessary to show that the ELCC growth rate is not a sustainable long-run equilibrium. 
  This then raises the question of how an economy that is experiencing a virtuous circle of 
export-led growth (e.g., at the point where y = yE in Figure 3) in the short run will adjust to grow 
instead at the lower BPC growth rate yB in the long run.  Since the BP constraint cannot be 
expected to rise to intersect DR at yE, for the reasons discussed above, instead the DR relation 
must fall to intersect BP at yB, and the question becomes what adjustment mechanism(s) can be 
expected to make DR fall toward BP in the long run.  The first and most obvious candidate is a 
decrease in the rate of growth of domestic expenditures a, which lowers the intercept term Ω in 
equation (5) and thereby shifts DR downward.  This could be accomplished either through 26 
 
deliberate government policy (e.g., contractionary fiscal or monetary policies),
37 or through 
private sector spending restraint (perhaps induced by rising debt burdens during the period of 
booming growth).  Thus, an “expenditure reducing policy” (or a private sector expenditure 
reduction) is a plausible way of making the ELCC equilibrium shift to coincide with the BPCG 
equilibrium.
38 
  A second possibility is a relative price adjustment.  As noted earlier, an export-led boom 
(such as where yE > yB in Figure 3) could be expected to lead to either faster nominal wage 
growth (a rise in w) or currency appreciation (a fall in e), either of which would also lower Ω and 
shift DR downward.  However, whether this is a stable adjustment process or not depends on 
whether relative price effects are allowed in the BPCG solution.  Consider first the cases 
assumed by Thirlwall and Dixon (1979), where either PPP or elasticity pessimism holds, so that 
equation (12) reduces to (10) or (10′).  In this situation, the BP curve is horizontal and is not 
affected by changes in w or e, so the DR relation can shift down toward a fixed BP relation and 
there can be a stable adjustment to the BPCG equilibrium where y = yB.  Thus, under Thirlwall 
and Dixon’s (1979) assumptions, and even allowing for financial flows, their BPC growth rate is 
a stable attractor for the long run equilibrium.  Indeed, the rise in w or fall in e in this situation 
can be seen as a mechanism that brings about the PPP condition assumed by Thirlwall and Dixon 
for the long run.  However, if the adjustments in w and e are not sufficient to establish PPP and 
Marshall-Lerner holds, then the relative price adjustment process may be unstable.  Assuming 
                                                 
37 This statement applies to reductions in the growth rate of government spending or increases in interest rates 
designed to slow the growth of private consumption and investment spending.  Tax increases that raise marginal tax 
rates would instead lower the Keynesian multiplier λ, which would reduce the slope as well as the intercept of the 
DR relation (5). 
38 Several empirical studies have researched to what extent fiscal and monetary policies as well as private sector 
spending respond endogenously to limit current account imbalances.  See, for example, Summers (1988), Bayoumi 
(1990), Artis and Bayoumi (1990), and Epstein and Gintis (1992). 27 
 
θεx + εm > 1 and e + p* − p ≠ 0, then ∂yB/∂e > 0 and ∂yB/∂w < 0 in (12), so a fall in e or rise in w 
would also shift the BP relation downward in Figure 3, and, depending on the other parameters, 
the downward shift in DR might never catch up with the downward shift in BP so that the BPCG 
equilibrium would never be reached.  The longer the time period considered, however, the more 
likely it is that PPP would eventually rule, and hence the more likely that the adjustment process 
will eventually prove to be stable. 
  Similar considerations would apply in the opposite case depicted in Figure 4.  If the econ-
omy was growing at the (low, sluggish) rate yE < yB in Figure 4, the country would be experi-
encing a continuously increasing ratio of CA/Y, which is not plausible in the long run.  Conse-
quently, the country would have to adjust through either expansion of domestic demand (a rise in 
a, perhaps through “expenditure increasing policies”) or else a real depreciation (rise in e or fall 
in w relative to p*), assuming that the relative price changes would bring about a stable adjust-
ment process (which is more likely, if the changes in w or e bring the country toward PPP in the 
very long run). 
  There is, however, another way of modeling the BP constraint with financial flows that 
could make it flexible so that the economy could possibly adjust to grow at the rate yE (in the 
situation shown in either Figure 3 or 4).  That is, if we model financial flows following the 
approach of Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), who did not impose the assumption of a constant ratio 
of CA/Y, the balance of payments equilibrium condition can be written as: 
(8″)     (1−φ)(x + p) + φf = e + p* + m , 
where (using lower case letters to represent growth rates and upper case Roman letters to 
represent levels of variables) f is the growth rate of financial inflows (F, measured in domestic 
currency) and φ = F/(PX + F) is financial inflows as a percentage of total “receipts” in the 28 
 
balance of payments (if there are net financial outflows then F < 0, and also φ < 0 assuming –F < 
PX).  If we then substitute equations (1) and (7) for export and import demand and (2) and (3) to 
incorporate cumulative causation, we obtain the following (modified) version of Thirlwall and 
Hussain’s most general solution for the BPC growth rate as a function of a given rate of increase 
in financial inflows f:
39 
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  Assuming that the denominator of (13) is positive, as seems necessary for intuitively 
plausible results, then ∂yB/∂f > 0.  Now the outcome depends on whether f is exogenously fixed 
or can adjust “elastically” in a situation where yB ≠ yE.  Suppose, for example, yB < yE as in Fig-
ure 3.
40  It is plausible that, in a country experiencing an export-led boom, financial inflows 
would be attracted into the country’s growing economy, thereby increasing f and raising the BPC 
growth rate yB toward the higher rate yE.  Similarly, if yB > yE as in Figure 4, it is plausible that in 
a country stuck in a “vicious circle” of slow export growth and slow productivity growth, finan-
cial inflows would be reduced or outflows would increase, thereby depressing f and pushing yB 
downward toward yE.  On the other hand, if financial markets are relatively closed and financial 
inflows or outflows are “inelastic,” then yB cannot adjust toward yE and the BP constraint will 
remain in force at a fixed level of f. 
                                                 







φ η φ ) ( ) 1 (




40 Note that, if (8″) replaces (8) as the BP equilibrium condition, then the BP constraint (12) shown in Figures 3 and 
4 (i.e., yB written as a function of q) would have to be replaced by the following expression: 
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which would be upward sloping if (1 – φ)εx + εm – 1 + φ  > 0.  Also note that if this BP constraint replaces (12), then 
the meaning of being above or below the BP line also changes: points above it represent higher rates of growth of 
financial inflows (f) and points below it represent lower rates f. 29 
 
  The catch here is that, if it is flexible, f cannot change too drastically relative to the rate of 
nominal income growth (y + p) or the country may experience a potentially unsustainable explo-
sion of its foreign debt or asset position.  In the case shown in Figure 3, if f < y + p initially and f 
does not have to increase too much to make yB = yE, the BP constraint could be relaxed and the 
country could enjoy its export-led growth boom as long as the financial inflows kept growing at 
the requisite rate and the CA deficit and external debt did not become unsustainably large.  On 
the other hand, if f would have to rise so much that f > y + p would result, then the CA/Y ratio 
would begin to fall continuously and, as noted previously, this is implausible in the long run.   
  Even so, such an export-led boom financed by financial inflows could easily persist for a 
while, perhaps sustained by bubble behavior in financial markets (since it is typical in a bubble 
that investors suspend disbelief and ignore warning signs of unsustainable financial positions—
see Shiller, 2008), leading eventually to some kind of financial crash or debt crisis marked by a 
shift from a bubble to a panic mentality in the financial markets.  In this case, the financial crisis 
would be the “enforcement mechanism” that would impose a stricter BP constraint in the long 




  In spite of their differences, the BPCG and ELCC models share common roots in 
Kaldor’s ideas about the centrality of export markets for facilitating demand-led growth in open 
economies. Both models have found empirical support in the literature, although upon closer 
examination it appears that support for the strongest versions of the BPCG model (i.e., the 
versions that exclude relative price effects) is found mainly in very long-run data while support 30 
 
for ELCC models is to be found mostly in studies that adopt a more medium-run perspective. If 
relative price effects are allowed in BGCG-type models—and the evidence suggests that these 
may be significant for some countries over periods of a decade or longer—then it is possible to 
incorporate the cumulative causation effects emphasized in the ELCC approach in models that 
embed a BP constraint.  However, the solution of this synthetic model is different from the one 
that emerges from a pure ELCC model without a BP constraint. 
  Allowing for financial flows, which is important for considering open economies in an 
epoch of financial liberalization, adds further insight to the comparison of the two approaches. If 
we assume, following Thirlwall and Hussain (1982), that countries can obtain financial inflows 
that grow at steady rates, then it is conceivable that a country undergoing rapid export-led growth 
à la the ELCC model could relax its BP constraint and continue to grow rapidly by increasing the 
growth rate of its financial inflows.  However, as pointed out by Moreno-Brid (1989), financial 
inflows cannot grow at any arbitrary rate in the long run without potentially causing the current 
account balance (deficit or surplus) to rise without limit as a percentage of GDP, which would be 
unsustainable.  If instead we follow Moreno-Brid’s approach and assume that the current account 
balance must be a stable fraction of GDP in the long run, then it becomes clear that the BP con-
straint really is binding and the ELCC equilibrium cannot generally be reached, even if cumula-
tive causation effects are incorporated in the BPCG model. Or, to put it another way, increasing 
financial inflows can at most be a temporary way of relaxing the BP constraint, but they do not 
allow a country to grow at the ELCC growth rate in the long run. 
  The conclusion that the strict BPCG model holds only in the very long run when relative 
price effects can be ignored (e.g., due to PPP holding) should not, of course, be surprising. Since 
its earliest formulations (e.g., Thirlwall, 1979), the BPCG model without relative price effects 31 
 
has always been intended as a long-run model.  But, this should not be taken to imply that 
medium-run models such as ELCC are irrelevant. Setterfield (2002) has suggested that the ELCC 
approach does not define a stable long-run equilibrium, but rather defines a sort of punctuated 
equilibrium phenomenon in which a country settles for some period of time on a growth path 
defined by a certain set of demand and productivity conditions (i.e., DR and PR regimes), but 
then moves along a “traverse” toward a new equilibrium as the underlying parameters of the 
system endogenously adjust.
41  In this view of the ELCC model, the equilibrium solution of the 
model is at best a “weak attractor” for the medium run (Setterfield, 2002, p. 227), and negative 
as well as positive feedbacks are admitted into the long-run evolution of an economy (which is 
seen as a path-dependent process). Although Thirlwall’s Law may hold in growth rate form in 
the very long run, we may conjecture that it is possible that the level of income at which a 
country’s BP constraint is satisfied could be permanently affected by its virtuous or vicious 
circles of cumulative causation over the intervening medium-run periods. 
  
                                                 
41 On the issue of whether some of the parameters of the BPCG model can adjust endogenously, see Krugman 
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